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INTRODUCTION

In the legal sphere, some of the most dominant elements of
President Donald Trump’s first year in office were his executive
orders. This article focuses on the following (the “Trump Executive
Orders”): the three travel ban orders,1 the sanctuary jurisdictions
order,2 the two successive transgender military exclusion
memoranda,3 and the Attorney General statement indicating
rescission of the Deferred Action on Childhood Arrivals (DACA)
program.4 These orders attracted much national media attention
and were clearly intended to produce political effects. As a
presidential candidate, Trump campaigned for a ban on Muslim
immigration5 and a wall at the United States-Mexico border,6 and
made other statements that solidified support among his populist
base.7
1. See infra Part II.A.
2. See infra Part II.B.
3. See infra Part II.C.
4. See infra Part II.D. Although President Trump’s memorandum on
transgender military exclusion and the statement from Attorney General Sessions
on DACA are not technically executive orders, they are intended to have legal
effects in the executive branch, and are accordingly treated in this article as akin to
executive orders. The memorandum and DACA statement are encompassed
whenever this article references the Trump Executive Orders.
5. Jeremy Diamond, Donald Trump: Ban All Muslim Travel to U.S., CNN (Dec.
8, 2015, 3:18 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/07/politics/donald-trumpmuslim-ban-immigration/index.html [https://perma.cc/CNM7-AYN5] (discussing
candidate Trump’s press release calling for a “total and complete shutdown of
Muslims entering the United States”).
6. See Politico Staff, Full Text: Donald Trump Immigration Speech in Arizona,
POLITICO (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/donaldtrump-immigration-address-transcript-227614
[https://perma.cc/5ZDA-K3XW]
(announcing campaign promise to build a wall).
7. See Ronald F. Inglehart & Pippa Norris, Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of
Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash 5 (Harv. Kennedy Sch., Working
Paper RWP16-026, 2016), https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/getFile.a
spx?Id=1401 [https://perma.cc/PTZ2-Y36E] (“[Trump’s] populism is rooted in
claims that he is an outsider to D.C. politics, a self-made billionaire leading an
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The Trump Executive Orders, as efforts to fulfill some of these
promises made during the campaign, have significant political roots.
As documents designed to have legal force and effect, they also have
legal significance. Taken together, they demonstrate a strong desire
to exclude certain populations and entities from the benefits of
being part of American society. The Trump Executive Orders reflect
the exclusionary bent of his populism. As a political proposition,
calling to exclude the outsider benefitted Trump’s candidacy. But,
as a principle of presidential legal action, it has been problematic.
Federal courts have been hostile to most of the Trump Executive
Orders,8 and with respect to DACA, a federal court’s initial
invalidation of the related Deferred Action for Parents of Americans
and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) program left the door
open to continued operation of DACA.9
The courts’ decisions indicate somewhat ironic results. The
exclusionary effect of the Trump Executive Orders is, in a sense, an
effort to “turn the clock back” in the affected subject-matter areas.
That is, they intended to halt the momentum built during President
Obama’s years in office and to begin movement in the opposite
direction.10 Through enjoining these orders, federal courts are
making analytical strides that move constitutional doctrine in a
direction that conforms more with the momentum that the Trump
administration is battling.11 While the Trump administration has
been trying to halt momentum toward liberalization in the political
realm, some courts have been developing new doctrines moving
liberalization forward in the judicial realm.12 This article attempts to
insurgency movement on behalf of ordinary Americans disgusted with the corrupt
establishment, incompetent politicians, dishonest Wall Street speculators, arrogant
intellectuals, and politically correct liberals.”).
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part IV.D.1.
10. See Peter Baker, Can Trump Destroy Obama’s Legacy?, N.Y. TIMES (June
23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/23/sunday-review/donald-trumpbarack-obama.html [https://perma.cc/3H2X-GHWH] (“The president seems
determined to define his time in office by demolishing what his predecessor did.”).
11. E.g., Jesse Lempel, Tier III Terrorist Designations: The Trump Administration
and Courts Move in Opposite Directions, LAWFARE (Dec. 5, 2017), https://lawfareblog.
com/tier-iii-terrorist-designations-trump-administration-and-courts-move-oppositedirections [https://perma.cc/TA5P-Z3NU] (“[T]he administration’s boost to the
[Patriot Act’s] system [of granting the President unilateral authority] runs counter
to the trend in the courts expressing skepticism—if not outright alarm—at the
sweeping and unpredictable application of immigration bars . . . .”).
12. See infra Part IV.
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describe, and point to the irony of, courts using doctrinal expansion
and novel interpretation in ways that run counter to President
Trump’s exclusionary agenda.
II. TRUMP EXECUTIVE ORDERS
As others have noted, virtually all U.S. presidents have issued
executive orders.13 There is nothing unconstitutional, per se, about
a president issuing an executive order. However, any particular
executive order with terms or effects that violate one of the
proscriptions of the Constitution (such as the First Amendment or
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment) is, of course,
unconstitutional. And all executive orders unsupported by
Congressional authorization are constitutionally valid only if they
stay within the scope of legitimate executive authority.14
A.

Travel Ban Orders

The three travel bans are probably the most notorious of the
Trump Executive Orders—no doubt owing in part to the successive
judicial invalidations of the first two, and their replacement by the
third.15
1. First Travel Ban Order
Soon after the start of his administration, President Trump
issued the first travel ban order, Executive Order 13769.16 This order
13. John Woolley & Gerhard Peters, Executive Orders: Washington – Trump, AM.
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Dec. 20, 2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/data/order
s.php [https://perma.cc/CE23-9KST] (identifying that only William Henry
Harrison failed to issue an executive order during his term and no president since
Chester Arthur has issued fewer than one hundred executive orders).
14. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634–38
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“When the President acts in absence of either a
congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own
independent powers . . . .”).
15. See generally Jaweed Kaleem, From ‘See You in Court!’ to the Supreme Court: Who’s
Up and Down in the History of Trump’s Travel Ban, LA TIMES (Dec. 5, 2017),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/immigration/la-na-travel-ban-history-2017-htmlst
ory.html [http://perma.cc/8ZTU-LXCN] (providing a cursory overview of history
regarding the Trump travel bans).
16. Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States,
Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Feb. 1, 2017) [hereinafter First Travel
Ban Order].
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barred entry of aliens from seven specified countries (with majority
Muslim populations) 17 into the United States for a period of ninety
days.18 It also reduced the number of refugees to be admitted in 2017
by over fifty percent,19 barred the entry of Syrian refugees into the
United States indefinitely,20 and imposed a 120-day suspension of the
U.S. Refugee Admissions Program.21
A salient feature of the first travel ban order was that it directed
the Secretary of State to prioritize refugee claims by individuals on
the basis of religion-based persecution when they were adherents of
a religion that was a minority religion in their home country.22 This
was widely perceived as a measure that favored Christian immigrants
arriving from majority-Muslim countries.23 A federal district court
judge in Seattle imposed an injunction on the first travel ban order,24
for reasons discussed below,25 and this injunction was sustained by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.26

17. See Kyle Blaine & Julia Horowitz, How the Trump Administration Chose the 7
Countries in the Immigration Executive Order, CNN (Jan. 30, 2017),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/29/politics/how-the-trump-administration-chosethe-7-countries/index.html [https://perma.cc/939G-R8MV] (noting that the
countries of Iraq, Syria, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen were all affected by
the ban).
18. First Travel Ban Order, supra note 16, § 3(c), 82 Fed. Reg. at 8978.
19. Id. § 5(d), 82 Fed. Reg. at 8979 (permitting entry of no more than fifty
thousand refugees).
20. Id. § 5(c), 82 Fed. Reg. at 8979.
21. Id. § 5(a), 82 Fed. Reg. at 8979.
22. Id. § 5(e), 82 Fed. Reg. at 8979 (“[T]he Secretaries of State and Homeland
Security may jointly determine to admit individuals to the United States as refugees
on a case-by-case basis . . . including when the person is a religious minority in his
country of nationality facing religious persecution.”).
23. See Richard Gonzales, Trump’s Refugee Plan Will Prioritize Christians
Suffering Religious Persecution, NPR (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/
thetwo-way/2017/01/26/511903885/trump-s-refugee-plan-will-prioritize-christianrefugees [https://perma.cc/BMD2-Q6XH] (“[T]he actions include a 120-day
moratorium on any new refugees entering the United States to give the government
time to come up with a plan that prioritizes Christians suffering from religious
persecution.”).
24. Washington v. Trump, No. C17-014IJLR, 2017 WL 462040, at *1 (W.D.
Wash. Feb. 3, 2017).
25. See infra Part IV.A.
26. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017).
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2. Second Travel Ban Order
The Trump administration issued the second travel ban order27
to replace the first. Again, it provided for a temporary ban on entry
of immigrants from specifically named Muslim-majority countries
for a ninety-day period,28 but with terms adjusted, ostensibly to
address the defects criticized by the courts. This second order
reduced the number of countries affected to six,29 did not include
an indefinite ban on entry by Syrian refugees, and eliminated the
provision perceived to aid Christians from majority-Muslim states.
This second travel ban order was in turn enjoined by federal district
court judges in Maryland and Hawaii.30 These injunctions were
upheld by the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, respectively.31 The United
States Supreme Court initially granted certiorari on both cases, but
then vacated the earlier rulings upon determining that, with the
expiration of the relevant ninety-day periods, the issues were moot.32
3. Third Travel Ban Order
On September 24, 2017, President Trump issued a presidential
proclamation putatively setting forth a permanent version of the
travel ban,33 limiting immigration from eight specified countries.34
This version of the travel ban was enjoined by a federal district court
judge in Maryland on October 17, 2017.35 Shortly thereafter, the
27. Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States,
Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 9, 2017) [hereinafter Second
Travel Ban Order].
28. Id. § 2(c), 82 Fed. Reg. at 13213.
29. Id. (limiting the banned countries to Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria,
and Yemen).
30. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539 (D. Md.
2017); Hawai’i v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227 (D. Haw. 2017).
31. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017);
Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017).
32. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 138 S.Ct. 353 (2017); Trump v.
Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. 377 (2017).
33. Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted
Entry into the United States by Terrorist or Other Public-Safety Threats,
Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 24, 2017) [hereinafter Third
Travel Ban Order].
34. Id. § 2, 82 Fed. Reg. at 45165–67 (suspending immigration from the
countries of Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen).
35. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570, 633 (D. Md.
2017).

2018]

TRUMP EXECUTIVE ORDERS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 913

Supreme Court stayed the injunction pending review by the Fourth
Circuit, and potentially by the Supreme Court itself.36 As of this
writing, the Fourth Circuit has issued no appellate opinion in the
case.
Also on October 17, 2017, a federal district judge in Hawaii
enjoined the third version of the travel ban.37 This injunction,
although stayed by the Supreme Court,38 was confirmed by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.39 The federal
government petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari in
the Hawaii case—which was granted on January 19, 2018—and oral
argument took place on April 25, 2018.40
B.

Sanctuary Jurisdictions Order

A number of cities and counties in various parts of the United
States have policies limiting their cooperation in certain respects
with federal immigration authorities.41 Such cities and counties are
often referred to as “sanctuary jurisdictions.”42 Even before President
Trump issued the first travel ban order, he issued an executive order
designed to inhibit cities and counties from limiting their
cooperation in key respects.43 The order directs the Secretary of
Homeland Security and the Attorney General to “ensure” that
36. Order Granting Stay of Injunction Pending Appeal, Trump v. Int’l Refugee
Assistance Project, No. 17A560 (Dec. 4, 2017), https://cases.justia.com/federal/di
strictcourts/maryland/mddce/8:2017cv00361/379052/237/0.pdf?ts=1512637567
[https://perma.cc/V7MV-355H]. Specifically, the Court stayed the injunction
“pending disposition of the Government’s appeal in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and disposition of the Government’s petition for a
writ of certiorari if such writ is sought.” Id.
37. Hawaii v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1160 (D. Haw. 2017).
38. Order Granting Stay of Injunction Pending Appeal, Trump v. Hawaii, No.
17A550 (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/1204
17zr_4gd5.pdf [https://perma.cc/65QX-QTLP]. The terms of this order were
substantially identical to those of the order in the International Refugee Assistance
Project case.
39. Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662, 702 (9th Cir. 2017).
40. Trump v. Hawaii, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/ca
ses/trump-v-hawaii-3/ [https://perma.cc/2E9C-BHAD] (last visited June 20, 2018).
41. Jennifer C. Critchley & Lisa J. Trembly, Historical Review, Current Status and
Legal Considerations Regarding Sanctuary Cities, 306 N.J. LAW. 32, 34 (June 2017)
(estimating there are between 300–350 sanctuary cities in the U.S.).
42. Id. at 32.
43. Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, Exec. Order
No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017).
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jurisdictions that do not supply information to federal immigration
authorities be “[in]eligible to receive federal grants.”44
In response to litigation initiated by Santa Clara County and the
City and County of San Francisco,45 a judge sitting on the Federal
District Court for the Northern District of California issued a
nationwide injunction against the sanctuary jurisdictions executive
order.46 The judge made this injunction permanent in a separate
order granting summary judgment on November 20, 2017.47
Early 2018 saw additional litigation concerning the sanctuary
jurisdictions executive order. In the first few months of 2018, four
federal courts issued notable opinions connected to the executive
order, although they differ in an observable respect from the 2017
opinions for the Santa Clara/San Francisco case. These courts did
not address enforcement of the sanctuary jurisdictions executive
order itself. Rather, they addressed determinations by the
Attorney General to withhold funding—under specific federal
programs—from the relevant jurisdictions because they were
sanctuary jurisdictions. The two programs involved were the Edward
Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program (often called the
“Byrne JAG” Program),48 and grants issued by the Office of
Community Oriented Policing Services (often called “COPS”
grants).49
In one of these cases,50 the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania initially granted a preliminary
injunction against the Attorney General from rejecting, on sanctuary
jurisdiction grounds, the application submitted by the City of
Philadelphia under the Byrne JAG Program.51 The court also
enjoined the Attorney General from so withholding any funding to
44. Id. § 9(a) at 8801.
45. Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 507 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19,
2017).
46. Id. at 540.
47. Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, No. 17-cv-00574-WHO, No. 17-cv-00485WHO, 2017 WL 5569835, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2017).
48. This program is administered pursuant to 34 U.S.C. §§ 10151–10158.
49. The basis for COPS grants is apparently internal within the Department of
Justice, as opposed to expressly statutory. See About, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CMTY.
ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., https://cops.usdoj.gov/about [https://perma.cc/BS94365B].
50. City of Phila. v. Sessions, No. 17-3894, 2018 WL 1305789 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13,
2018).
51. See id. at *4.
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the City under that program.52 The court then denied the
government’s motion to dismiss the City’s complaint.53
In the second case,54 the United States District Court for the
Central District of California granted partial summary judgment to
the City of Los Angeles against the Attorney General, enjoining him
from imposing conditions on the City’s receipt of COPS grants that
were rooted in the sanctuary jurisdictions executive order.55
In the third case,56 a panel of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction preventing
the Attorney General from imposing certain conditions, rooted in
the executive order, on the City of Chicago in its effort to obtain
Byrne JAG Program funds.57
The fourth case58 was a bit of an outlier. It was brought by the
State of California, rather than a city, and the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California denied the State’s
motion for a preliminary injunction.59 Unlike the other cases
described in this section, this result was substantially in favor of the
government.
C.

Transgender Military Exclusion Memoranda

On August 25, 2017, President Trump issued a memorandum60
that embodied three primary effects. First, it indefinitely extended
the previous temporary prohibition against transgender individuals
entering the military.61 Second, it required the military to authorize,
no later than March 23, 2018, the discharge of transgender service
members.62 These two measures are sometimes referred to as the

52. Id.
53. Id. at *13.
54. City of L.A. v. Sessions, 293 F. Supp. 3d 1087 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2018).
55. Id. at 1101.
56. City of Chi. v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. Apr. 19, 2018).
57. See id. at 293 (concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in issuing the preliminary injunction).
58. California ex rel. Becerra v. Sessions, 284 F. Supp. 3d 1015 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
5, 2018).
59. Id. at 1037.
60. Memorandum on Military Service by Transgender Individuals, 2017 DAILY
COMP. PRESS DOC. 587 (Aug. 25, 2017) https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD201700587/pdf/DCPD-201700587.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BNG-QGUM].
61. Id. § 2(a).
62. Id. § 3.
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“Accession Directive” and the “Retention Directive,”63 respectively.
Third, the memorandum prohibited the expenditure of military
resources on sex reassignment surgeries.64
Four federal district courts enjoined the transgender military
exclusion memorandum: the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia,65 the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland,66 the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington,67 and the United States District
Court for the Central District of California.68
In February 2018, the Department of Defense issued a
document titled “Report and Recommendations on Military Service
by Transgender Persons.”69 It announced three elements of a new
63. See Doe 1 v. Trump, No. 17–1597 (CKK), 2017 WL 4873042, at *1.
64. Memorandum on Military Service by Transgender Individuals, supra note
60, § 2(b).
65. Doe 1, 2017 WL 4873042, at *33. The United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia later denied an emergency motion for an administrative
stay pending appeal. Doe 1 v. Trump, 2017 WL 6553389, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22,
2017).
66. Stone v. Trump, No. MJG-17-2459, 2017 WL 5589122, at *16 (D. Md. Nov.
21, 2017).
67. Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-1297-MJP, 2017 WL 6311305, at *10 (W.D.
Wash. Dec. 11, 2017). The court also denied a subsequent defense motion for
clarification and partial stay, Karnoski v. Trump, C17-1297-MJP, 2017 WL 6733723,
at *3 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 29, 2017), and a later defense motion for a continuance
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). Karnoski v. Trump, 2018 WL 993973,
at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 21, 2018).
68. Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, Stockman v. Trump, No. 5:17-1799 JGB, at 21 (C.D. Cal.
Dec. 22, 2017); see Second Court Rejects Trump Bid to Stop Transgender Military Recruits,
REUTERS (Dec. 22, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-courttransgender/second-court-rejects-trump-bid-to-stop-transgender-military-recruitsidUSKBN1EH00R [https://perma.cc/EGK5-GZUD] (last visited June 20, 2018):
Also on Friday [December 22], a federal trial court in Riverside,
California, blocked the ban while the case proceeds, making it the
fourth to do so, after similar rulings in Baltimore, Seattle and
Washington, D.C. U.S. District Judge Jesus Bernal said without the
injunction the plaintiffs, including current and aspiring service
members, would suffer irreparable harm. “There is nothing any court
can do to remedy a government-sent message that some citizens are not
worthy of the military uniform simply because of their gender,” he
added.
69. Declaration of Ryan B. Parker, Karnoski v. Trump, No. 2:17-cv-1297-MJP,
Exhibit 2, at 10 (Mar. 23, 2018), militarypartners.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/

2018]

TRUMP EXECUTIVE ORDERS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 917

“transgender policy,” all of which were overtly hostile to military
service by transgender persons. The first element of the policy was
that “transgender persons without a history or diagnosis of gender
dysphoria, who are otherwise qualified for service, may serve, like all
other Service members, in their biological sex.”70 The second
element was that “transgender persons who require or have
undergone gender transition are disqualified.”71 And the third
element was that “transgender persons with a history or diagnosis of
gender dysphoria are disqualified, except under certain limited
circumstances.”72
On March 23, 2018, President Trump issued a new
memorandum, in light of this document.73 In his new
memorandum, he first revoked his earlier memorandum regarding
military service by transgender persons from August 25, 2017.74 The
memorandum then stated that the Secretary of Defense and the
Secretary of Homeland Security “may exercise their authority to
implement any appropriate policies concerning military service by
transgender individuals.”75 This language, which at first glance may
seem rather mild in view of the condemnatory tone and effects of
the February report, may have been intended to help facilitate
implementation of the February 2018 policy. On April 13, 2018, the
District Court for the Western District of Washington granted in part
and denied in part the plaintiffs’ and defendants’ opposing motions
for summary judgment.76
D.

DACA Rescission Statement

DACA was originally set forth by former Secretary of Homeland
Security Janet Napolitano in a June 15, 2012 memorandum,
charging certain members of her staff with particular immigration

03/March-23-policy-implementation.pdf [https://perma.cc/GR8X-DBG7].
70. Id. at 32.
71. Id. at 32–41.
72. Id. at 41–43 (detailing the limited circumstances exempted from the third
element of the transgender policy).
73. Id. at Exhibit 3.
74. Id. § 1.
75. Id. § 2.
76. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs’ and Washington’s
Motions for Summary Judgment, Karnoski v. Trump, 2018 WL 1784464, at *14
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 13, 2018).
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duties.77 It was thematically linked to the DAPA program.78 Neither
program was specifically authorized by congressional action, but the
Obama administration took the position that both were mere
exercises of prosecutorial discretion.79
The DAPA program was designed to provide leniency for
undocumented adults whose minor children were born in the
United States (and were therefore U.S. citizens) or whose minor
children were otherwise U.S. legal residents.80 The DACA program
provides leniency for certain undocumented young U.S. residents
who were brought to the United States as young minors and evinced
certain positive indicators.81
In 2015, a federal district court in Texas enjoined the DAPA
program.82 The Fifth Circuit upheld the injunction,83 and that
judgment was in turn upheld by an evenly divided Supreme Court.84
The Trump administration rescinded the DACA program during its
first year in office, thereby discontinuing any governmental attempt
to defend the policy.85 The move was taken in a statement by

77. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, U.S. Sec’y of Dept. of Homeland
Sec. to David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r of U.S. Customs & Border Prot. et al.
(June 15, 2012), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorialdiscretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf [https://perma.cc/NLH9VLFH].
78. See Memorandum from Jeh Johnson, Sec’y of Dept. of Homeland Sec. to
Leo Rodriguez, Dir. of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Serv.’s et. al. (Nov. 20,
2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_de
ferred_action.pdf [https://perma.cc/GC9V-WVP2].
79. See, e.g., 2014 Executive Actions on Immigration, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGRATION
SERVS.,
https://www.uscis.gov/archive/2014-executive-actionsimmigration [https://perma.cc/EN7H-3LWS] (last visited June 20, 2018)
(outlining President Obama’s position on expansion of DACA and DAPA);
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Immigration (June 15,
2012), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/rema
rks-president-immigration [https://perma.cc/HJF4-7Z5T] (discussing his support
of Secretary Napolitano’s memorandum).
80. Johnson, supra note 78.
81. Napolitano, supra note 77.
82. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
83. Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 743 (5th Cir. 2015).
84. Texas v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016).
85. Full Text: Jeff Sessions on Trump Ending DACA Program, POLITICO (Sept. 5,
2017) https://www.politico.com/story/2017/09/05/trump-ending-daca-dreamersprogram-sessions-transcript-242326 [https://perma.cc/Q8UL-EPM3] [hereinafter
DACA Rescission Statement].
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Attorney General Jeff Sessions on September 5, 2017.86 Other
governmental statements indicated that the rescission would not be
completely effective until March 2018, thereby giving Congress a
chance to provide analogous relief in statutory form.87
Two federal district courts then enjoined most of the operative
prospective effect of the DACA rescission: the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California on January 9, 2018,88
and the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York on February 13, 2018.89 In the California case, the
government asked the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari before
judgment—that is, before the Ninth Circuit could have an
opportunity to review on appeal.90 On February 26, 2018, the
Supreme Court denied this request.91
86. Id.
87. See Presidential Statement on the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
Policy, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRESS DOC. 609 (Sept. 5, 2017) https://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201700609/pdf/DCPD-201700609.pdf [https://perma.cc/89BE24V3] (“This is a gradual process, not a sudden phaseout. Permits will not begin to
expire for another 6 months . . . . I am not going to just cut DACA off, but rather
provide a window of opportunity for Congress to finally act.”).
88. Order Denying FRCP 12(b)(1) Dismissal and Granting Provisional Relief,
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. C17-05211 WHA, at 48
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2018), https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/california
/candce/3:2017cv05211/316722/234/0.pdf?ts=1515577022 [https://perma.cc/M
5AE-MZLN]. The court ordered the government to “maintain the DACA program
on a nationwide basis on the same terms and conditions as were in effect before the
rescission on September 5, 2017,” but with the exceptions:
(1) that new applications from applicants who have never before
received deferred action need not be processed; (2) that the advance
parole feature need not be continued for the time being for anyone; and
(3) that defendants may take administrative steps to make sure fair
discretion is exercised on an individualized basis for each renewal
application.
Id.
89. Amended Memorandum & Order & Preliminary Injunction, Batalla Vidal
v. Nielsen, No. 16-CV-4756 (NGG) (JO), at 53–55 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2018),
https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/new-york/nyedce/1:2016cv04756
/390395/255/0.pdf?ts=1518610640 [https://perma.cc/NJ5L-45LN]. The court
imposed a preliminary injunction substantially similar to, and with exceptions
substantially similar to, that imposed in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. order. Id. at 53.
90. Dep’t. of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., SCOTUSBLOG,
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/department-homeland-security-v-reg
ents-university-california/ [https://perma.cc/C9FN-42LW] (last visited June 20,
2018).
91. Id.

920

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:3

After the two injunctions, the government moved to dismiss in
both the New York and California actions, and also in analogous
litigation in the United States District Courts for the District of
Maryland92 and District of Columbia.93 The courts in all these actions
granted in part and denied in part the motions to dismiss, although
to different extents and for different reasons. Three of these four
court orders were basically sympathetic to the plaintiffs,94 and the
fourth (from Maryland) was broadly sympathetic to the
government.95
The injunctions against the President’s DACA rescission have
had their effect. It was reported that during the first three months of
2018, the Trump administration has approved tens of thousands of
DACA applications and renewals.96
E.

Overview of the Judicial Response to the Trump Executive Orders

The foregoing overview demonstrates that the judicial response
to the four Trump Executive Orders has been singular. Every one of
the Trump Executive Orders (including all three versions of the
travel ban order) was enjoined by a federal district court.
Furthermore, each of these injunctions that has been fully reviewed
by a federal circuit court of appeal has been sustained.

92. Casa de Md. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 284 F. Supp. 3d 758 (D. Md. Mar.
5, 2018).
93. NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209 (D.D.C. Apr. 24, 2018).
94. In the New York case, the court ruled against the motion to dismiss on four
out of six numbered bases for proposed dismissal. Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, 291 F.
Supp. 3d 260, 285–86 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2018). In the California case, the court
ruled against the motion to dismiss on only two of the five numbered bases for
proposed dismissal, but these two were arguably the most significant and
substantive, concerning the plaintiffs’ due process and equal protection claims.
Order Granting in Part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6),
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 298 F. Supp. 3d 1304, 1316
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2018). In the District of Columbia case, the court ruled against
the motion to dismiss on all but one of the eight numbered bases for proposed
dismissal. NAACP, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 249.
95. In the Maryland case, the court ruled in favor of the motion to dismiss on
all but one of the ten numbered bases for proposed dismissal. Casa de Md., 284 F.
Supp. 3d at 758.
96. Chantal da Silva, Is DACA Dead? Trump Administration Has Approved
55,000 Applications This Year, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 3, 2018), http://www.newsweek.com/
daca-dead-trump-administration-has-approved-55000-applications-year-870134 [htt
ps://perma.cc/U8ZH-3JQE].
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The consistency of the federal court reactions to the Trump
Executive Orders is noteworthy. After all, the subject matter of the
four orders is relatively wide-ranging. The transgender military
exclusion memorandum has nothing to do with the other three.
While the other three all concern immigration to some extent, they
address immigration from varying angles: the travel ban order
purportedly addresses immigration from the standpoint of security
against terrorism; the sanctuary jurisdictions order is addressed to
the behavior of United States jurisdictions rather than the
immigrants themselves; and the DACA rescission statement
addresses persons already with the United States for reasons apart
from security against terrorism. Given the variety of the factual
circumstances addressed by each order, the consistency of the
response of the federal courts has been remarkable.
It is true that the Supreme Court stayed the injunctions against
the travel ban order in the context of setting oral argument
regarding its review of them. For the moment, however, this stay is
defensibly viewed as having a chiefly procedural character, and does
not materially reduce the significance of this consistency of
approach. Even if the Supreme Court ultimately invalidates the
injunctions, the consistent views of the district courts and circuit
courts of appeal will have been noteworthy.
III. EXCLUSIONARY EFFECT OF THE TRUMP EXECUTIVE ORDERS
The common effect of the Trump Executive Orders is
exclusionary as a whole. The first two travel ban orders
excluded—and the third travel ban order continues to
exclude—immigrants from the named countries.97 The sanctuary
jurisdictions order attempts to exclude certain cities and counties
from receiving federal grants.98 The transgender military exclusion
memoranda attempt to exclude, of course, transgender persons
from the military.99 Finally, the DACA rescission statement attempts

97. First Travel Ban Order, supra note 16, § 3(c), 82 Fed. Reg. at 8978; Second
Travel Ban Order, supra note 27, § 2(c), 82 Fed. Reg. at 13213; Third Travel Ban
Order, supra note 33, § 2, 82 Fed. Reg. at 45165–67.
98. Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, supra note 43,
§ 9(a), 82 Fed. Reg. at 8801.
99. Memorandum on Military Service by Transgender Individuals, supra note
60, § 2(a).
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to exclude the young people it covers from remaining in the United
States.100
The current litigation environment surrounding the Trump
Executive Orders does not detract from their exclusionary character.
To the extent any of the current injunctions are invalidated, the
corresponding order(s) will, at that point, have the exclusionary
effects noted above. The discharge provisions of the original
transgender exclusion were supposed to become effective on March
23, 2018.101 Now, if and when the current injunctions are invalidated,
the new version of the transgender exclusion memorandum will take
effect at that point.
The full effect of the DACA rescission was also not to have been
felt until March 2018.102 The fact that intervening injunctions have
suspended the rescission for the moment does not detract from the
rescission’s intended exclusionary effects. These exclusions seem to
advance a policy of stasis, seeking to revert policy to the status quo
before the Obama administration took office.
IV. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE TRUMP EXECUTIVE ORDERS
A.

Constitutional Travel Ban Cases Further Develop an Expansive
Interpretation of the Establishment Clause

The courts that have enjoined the travel ban orders have either
chosen constitutional or statutory bases for injunction.103 This article
focuses on the analysis of the courts that have chosen constitutional
bases for injunction and their reliance on the Establishment Clause.
However, these courts use a type of Establishment Clause application
that has been unusual over the years. Accordingly, these cases have
the expansive effect of resurrecting a branch of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence that had been somewhat dormant.

100. DACA Rescission Statement, supra note 85.
101. Memorandum on Military Service by Transgender Individuals, supra note
60, § 3.
102. See Presidential Statement on the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
Policy, supra note 87.
103. See, e.g., Hawai’i v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1134–39 (D. Haw. 2017)
(justifying injunction under Establishment Clause principles); Int’l Refugee
Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 601, 604–05 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing the
Establishment Clause as the constitutional basis for injunction).
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The relevant concept in this unusual application is the second
element of the Lemon test. The test comes from Lemon v. Kurtzman,104
a 1971 Supreme Court case invalidating state-funding for teacher
compensation of secular subjects in private schools.105 In striking
down the state program, the Court enunciated the now-familiar
Lemon test. The test provides that a governmental action (in that
case, a state statute) will avoid violation of the Establishment Clause
if three circumstances pertain:
First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; [and] finally, the
statute must not foster an “excessive government
entanglement with religion.”106
An interesting aspect of the Lemon test is the phrase “nor
inhibits” in the second element of the test.107 It has been observed
by at least one expert that this phrase is somewhat confusing in the
Establishment Clause context.108 The Establishment Clause has its
roots in the fear of governmental adoption of a particular religion as
the state religion, directly or indirectly.109 Any such governmental
adoption is concerned primarily with advancing the chosen religion.
The adoption of one religion can be viewed as the inhibition of
others. But the serious inhibition of any religion is most effectively
challenged under the Free Exercise Clause, rather than the
Establishment Clause. Yet, the second element of the Lemon test uses
the “inhibition of religion” as an element of an Establishment Clause
analysis.110
The Supreme Court has used the Lemon test in many of its
decisions.111 However, the only major Supreme Court case in which
104. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
105. See id. at 614–22.
106. Id. at 612–13 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)
(quoting Walz v. Tax Comm., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970))).
107. Id.
108. Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of
Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373,
1380–85 (1981) (suggesting that the “inhibits” phrase is a “source of confusion” in
attempting to interpret and apply the Lemon test).
109. Michael A. Rosenhouse, Construction and Application of Establishment Clause
of First Amendment—U.S. Supreme Court Cases, 15 A.L.R. FED. 2d 573 (2006).
110. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
111. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005); McCreary Cty., Ky. v.
ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Wallace v.
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this “nor inhibits religion” aspect of Establishment Clause doctrine
was used as part of a holding was Larson v. Valente.112 This 1982 case
invalidated a Minnesota statute regulating solicitation by some, but
not all, religious groups.113 Other than this sole application, other
Supreme Court Establishment Clause cases before and since Larson
have not relied on the “nor inhibits religion” aspect of the Lemon
test.
However, those federal decisions that found the various versions
of the travel ban order to violate the Establishment Clause
necessarily relied on this “nor inhibits religion” aspect of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. To take the most recent
example, the October 17, 2017, ruling by the U.S. District Court for
the District of Maryland, in framing the Establishment Clause issue,
emphasized that the travel ban was “motivated by a desire to ban
Muslims as a group from entering the United States.”114 The focus
on negative targeting under and Establishment Clause framework
(as opposed to a Free Exercise Clause framework) attests to this
rarely used “inhibits religion” aspect of Establishment Clause
doctrine.
B.

Sanctuary Jurisdictions Case Deploys Conventional Constitutional
Concepts to Reach Novel Results

When the federal district court in Northern California—in the
Santa Clara/San Francisco litigation115—acted against the sanctuary
jurisdictions order, both at the preliminary injunction and
permanent injunction stages, it relied on the same rationale. It did
not rely on the Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause, the
Equal Protection Clause, or indeed any portion of the Constitution
generally thought to protect individual rights by the Constitution’s
terms. Instead, it relied on violations of Separation of Powers

Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
112. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
113. Under the statute (as in effect at the time the case was decided), “only those
religious organizations that received more than half of their total contributions
from members or affiliated organizations would [be] exempt from the registration
and reporting requirements” imposed by the statute. Id. at 231–32.
114. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570, 619 (D.
Md. 2017).
115. See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text.
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principles,116 the Spending Clause,117 the Tenth Amendment,118 and
the Fifth Amendment vagueness119 and Due Process concerns.120
As noted elsewhere, Spending Clause and Tenth Amendment
arguments are more characteristically advanced by judges and
justices considered to be conservative.121 They are structural
arguments designed to protect local governments from being
commandeered as arms of, and to protect local officials from being
pressed into service as agents of, the federal government.122 In the
most prominent Supreme Court cases denouncing these effects of
commandeering local government and pressing local officials into
federal service, the ultimate result has been in line with policy results
often favored by political conservatives. The anti-commandeering
imperative was established in New York v. United States,123 and resulted
in the invalidation of a federal scheme regulating the disposal of lowlevel radioactive waste.124 Particular antagonism against pressing
local officials into federal service was cemented in United States v.
Printz.125 The Court in Printz held the federal regulatory regime
regarding background checks for gun purchases invalid.126 Similarly,
the Court most recently used a Spending Clause argument to protect
state autonomy when invalidating aspects of President Obama’s
Affordable Care Act.127
But the Federal District Court for the Northern District of
California used these doctrines, most frequently associated with
advancing conservative policies, to invalidate President Trump’s

116. Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 530–32 (N.D. Cal. Apr.
25, 2017).
117. Id. at 532–33.
118. Id. at 533–34.
119. Id. at 534–36.
120. Id. at 536.
121. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitutionality of Withholding Federal Funds from
Sanctuary Cities, 40 L.A. LAW 60, 60 (2017) (“Ironically, this type of coercion of local
governments [deployed in the sanctuary jurisdictions order] violates principles of
federalism long advocated by the conservative justices on the Supreme Court.”).
122. Id. (“The federal government cannot turn local governments into
enforcement arms of the federal government.”).
123. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
124. Id. at 188.
125. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
126. See id. at 935.
127. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 575–85 (2012); see also
Chemerinsky, supra note 121, at 60.
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sanctuary jurisdictions order,128—thereby halting a measure
considered to advance conservative policies. Its reaction to the
sanctuary jurisdictions order was therefore another example of the
ways the Trump Executive Orders have resulted in judicial rulings
that expand upon previous arguments in novel ways.
This tendency continued through to most of the sanctuary
jurisdictions cases decided in early 2018. In the Philadelphia case,
the federal court in Eastern Pennsylvania determined that the City
was likely to succeed on the merits, in substantial part because of
Tenth Amendment and Spending Clause concerns.129 In the Los
Angeles case, the federal court in Central California relied
substantially on federalism concerns, including the Tenth
Amendment, in granting summary judgment.130 And in the Chicago
case, the Seventh Circuit cast its analysis in terms of separations of
powers, but in doing so expressed substantial sensitivity to federalism
concerns.131
In the federal case brought by the State of California in the
Northern District of California, the court denied the State’s motion
for a preliminary injunction.132 Here, the court determined that
Spending Clause and Tenth Amendment arguments did not allow
the State to prevail.133 But this ruling was in contrast to the other
judgments that were issued during this time period. This court’s
rejection of these assertions arguably accentuates the notable
tendency of the other courts to use them to advance the progressive
measures of the cities involved in the other cases.

128. Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 533–34 (N.D. Cal. Apr.
25, 2017).
129. City of Phila. v. Sessions, No. 17-3894, 2018 WL 1305789, at *4 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 13, 2018).
130. City of L.A. v. Sessions, 293 F. Supp. 3d 1087, 1096 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 11,
2018).
131. See City of Chi. v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 284 (7th Cir. Apr. 19, 2018)
(“None of [the] provisions [of the Byrne JAG Program statute] grant the Attorney
General the authority to impose conditions that require states or local governments
to assist in immigration enforcement . . . .”); see also id. at 285 (“[The Attorney
General’s interpretation] is inconsistent with the goal of the [Byrne JAG Program]
statute to support the needs of law enforcement while providing flexibility to state
and local governments.”).
132. California ex rel. Becerra v. Sessions, 284 F. Supp. 3d 1015, at 1037 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 5, 2018).
133. Id. at 1033–36.
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Transgender Exclusion Case Develops a Progressive Interpretation of
Equal Protection

A group of transgender service members, and transgender
persons aspiring to become service members, sued the Trump
administration shortly after the administration’s issuance of the first
transgender military exclusion memorandum.134 The Federal
District Court for the District of Columbia issued a preliminary
injunction, with national effect, against both the Accession and
Retention Directives stated in the memorandum.135
In granting these injunctions, the court determined that the
plaintiffs had shown a likelihood to succeed on the merits of their
claim based on the application of the Equal Protection Clause.136
The court’s Equal Protection analysis was notably progressive. The
court determined that “discrimination on the basis of someone’s
transgender identity is a quasi-suspect form of classification that
triggers heightened scrutiny.”137 While other federal district courts
have determined that discrimination on the basis of transgender
status is evaluated under intermediate scrutiny,138 such
determinations are still comparatively rare.
Indeed, there is no express determination to this effect at the
level of the federal circuit courts of appeal. The Seventh Circuit
determined in a recent en banc opinion139 that discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation constitutes sex discrimination within
the meaning of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.140 But that is
solely a statutory ruling, only pertaining within the Seventh Circuit,
and applying to sexual orientation rather than explicitly regarding
transgender status.141

134. Doe 1 v. Trump, No. 17-1597 (CKK), 2017 WL 4873042, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct.
30, 2017) (referring to the plaintiffs as “current and aspiring service members who
are transgender”).
135. See id. at *3–4 (setting forth the terms of the injunctions).
136. See id. at *3.
137. Id. at *28.
138. See, e.g., Adkins v. City of New York, 143 F. Supp. 3d 134, 140 (S.D.N.Y.
2015).
139. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a).
141. Hively, 853 F.3d at 343 (referring to the court’s task of determining “what
it means to discriminate on the basis of sex,” and “whether actions taken on the
basis of sexual orientation are a subset of actions taken on the basis of sex” as “a
pure question of statutory interpretation”).
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On November 21, 2017, the Federal District Court for the
District of Maryland issued a preliminary injunction against the first
transgender military exclusion memorandum.142 It voiced explicit
support for the rationale expressed by the District of Columbia
court: “[t]he Court finds persuasive the D.C. Court’s reasons for
applying intermediate scrutiny.”143 The Maryland court further
declared: “The Court also adopts the D.C. Court’s reasoning in the
application of intermediate scrutiny to the Directives and finds that
the Plaintiffs herein are likely to succeed on their Equal Protection
claim.”144
Although the degree of consensus among all federal circuit
courts of appeal regarding discrimination on the basis of
transgender status may be unclear, the rationale exhibited by both
the Maryland and D.C. federal district courts, in enjoining the
Accession and Retention Directives, is a distinctly progressive
approach in the area of equal protection doctrine.145
This tendency was accentuated when the Federal District Court
for the Western District of Washington later issued its order partially
granting and partially denying the parties’ opposing motions for
summary judgment.146 Because the degree to which the defendants
had satisfied their burden under equal protection analysis turned on
facts as yet undeveloped in the record, the court denied summary
judgment for the plaintiffs’ equal protection claims.147 However,
much more cogently, the court also engaged in a detailed equal
protection classification analysis, and determined that “transgender
people . . . are a suspect class,”148 such that “the applicable level of

142. Stone v. Trump, No. MJG–17–2459, 2017 WL 5589122, at *1 (D. Md. Nov.
21, 2017).
143. Id. at *15.
144. Id.
145. The District Court for the District of Columbia also held that the Accession
and Retention Directives were subject to intermediate scrutiny because they were
rooted in the failure of the current and aspiring service members to conform to
gender stereotypes. Doe 1 v. Trump, No. 17–1597 (CKK), 2017 WL 4873042, at *27
(D.D.C. Oct. 30, 2017).
146. Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-1297-MJP, 2018 WL 1784464, at *14 (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 13, 2018).
147. Id. at *13.
148. Id. at *9.
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scrutiny . . . is strict scrutiny.”149 On this classification point, the court
granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.150
This aspect of the court’s order was noteworthy, not least
because even government discrimination on the basis of sex warrants
only intermediate scrutiny,151 rather than strict scrutiny. This
determination by the federal district court in Seattle is thus an apt
example of judicial interpretations that are moving progressively, in
the face of the administration’s efforts to regress.
D.

The Current Litigation Environment for the DACA Rescission Appears
to Support DACA

A review of the current state of litigation concerning the DACA
rescission appears to support DACA in two ways. First, there is no
argument developed in current case law that DACA was initially
unconstitutional. Second, the DACA rulings so far support the use
of public statements by officials to help support an inference of
discriminatory intent.
1. Judicial Precedents for the DAPA Program Do Not Support
Constitutional Invalidation of the DACA Program
In rescinding the DACA program, Attorney General Sessions
asserted that the DACA program was unconstitutional.152 There are
no federal court decisions holding such. Instead, there are merely
cases invalidating the DAPA program.153 But these cases made no
findings of constitutional violations.
149. Id. at *14.
150. Id.
151. The Supreme Court’s insistence that government discrimination on the
basis of sex be evaluated according to intermediate scrutiny, rather than strict
scrutiny, goes back to 1976. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (stating that
sex-based classifications “must serve important governmental objectives and must
be substantially related to achievement of those objectives”). It is true that the
intermediate scrutiny applied to cases of official sex discrimination was tightened
somewhat under United States v. Virginia. 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (explaining that
the burden of justification for official classification based on gender “is
demanding . . ., rests entirely on the State . . ., must be genuine . . ., [and] must not
rely on overbroad generalizations”). But that case did not hold that the intermediate
scrutiny test put forward in Craig v. Boren was no longer the correct test.
152. DACA Rescission Statement, supra note 85.
153. See Texas v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016); Texas v. United States,
787 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2015); Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex.
2015).

930

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:3

It is true that throughout the life of the DAPA program,
objectors asserted that it was an unconstitutional violation of
separation of powers principles.154 After all, it was the codification,
in some sense, of a deployment of executive prosecutorial discretion
in ways that ran counter to the policy preferences of the
congressional majority. However, when the Federal District Court
for the Southern District of Texas enjoined the DAPA program in
2015, it did not do so on constitutional grounds. Instead, it
determined that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim
that DAPA violated the procedural requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).155 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the injunction on the basis of a substantial likelihood of
success on both the procedural156 and substantive157 claims of the
plaintiffs under the APA. Thus, the Fifth Circuit ruling also avoided
constitutional issues.
It is significant that the Texas federal courts chose violations of
the APA, rather than constitutional bases for enjoining the DAPA
program. Given the degree of hostility of the detractors of DAPA to
the program, and the degree to which constitutional violations were
asserted regarding DAPA in public discourse, a decision to avoid
legal resolution on those assertions may well reflect timidity or
uncertainty as to the legal strength of those constitutional
arguments. In any event, the failure of the courts to condemn DAPA
on constitutional grounds is certainly more encouraging to
proponents of DAPA and DACA than would have been a
constitutional invalidation.
By contrast, in his statement announcing rescission of the DACA
program, Attorney General Sessions both specifically relied on
constitutional precepts and mischaracterized the actions of the
Texas federal courts in the DAPA case. He announced that “[o]ur
collective wisdom” was that DACA was “vulnerable to the same legal
and constitutional challenges that the courts recognized with respect

154. See, e.g., Adam Liptak & Michael D. Shear, Supreme Court Tie Blocks Obama
Immigration Plan, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/
24/us/supreme-court-immigration-obama-dapa.html [https://perma.cc/MT82J87Q] (quoting Ken Paxton, Texas Attorney General, stating “[t]his is a major
setback to President Obama’s attempts to expand executive power, and a victory for
those who believe in the separation of powers and the rule of law”).
155. Texas, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 677.
156. Texas, 787 F.3d at 762–66.
157. Id. at 767–68.

2018]

TRUMP EXECUTIVE ORDERS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 931

to the DAPA program.”158 He thus incorrectly asserted that the
courts had enjoined DAPA on constitutional bases as well as the APA
bases.
He then acknowledged that the APA was the basis of the court
DAPA injunctions, by stating that “[t]he Fifth Circuit specifically
concluded that DACA had not been implemented in a fashion that
allowed sufficient discretion, and that DAPA was ‘foreclosed by
Congress’s careful plan.’”159 But he then mischaracterized the Fifth
Circuit conclusion by inaccurately paraphrasing it: “In other words,
[DAPA] was inconsistent with the Constitution’s separation of
powers.”160 In fact, there is no specific mention of separation of
powers in the Fifth Circuit opinion; the substantial bases of action
for both court rulings depend completely on statutory objections
based in the APA.161
The Trump administration’s mischaracterization of the DAPA
court actions, while still insisting that the rescission is based on
constitutional precepts, can be seen to actually weaken the
constitutional assertions. Not only do the Texas federal courts not
address separation of powers issues in their rulings, but the
administration’s continued insistence that they do can be seen to
accentuate the fact that they do not.
In the context of the Trump Executive Orders as a grouping of
executive actions, this aspect of the DACA rescission statement plays
into the progressive notion that the innovations expressed in the
DACA program were actually constitutionally unobjectionable.
Accordingly, in the example of the DACA rescission statement as
well, the administration’s attempt to advance a policy of stasis
actually results in judicial opinions that undercut the constitutional
arguments supporting the administration’s actions.
2. DACA Rulings Currently Support Reference to Public Statements
by Officials as Bases for Helping to Determine Discriminatory
Intent
For purposes of this review, it is salient to observe the approach
toward equal protection arguments taken by the courts addressing

158.
159.
160.
161.

DACA Rescission Statement, supra note 85, ¶ 14.
Id. at ¶ 15.
Id. at ¶16.
See Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 762–67 (5th Cir. 2015).
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the DACA rescission. The federal courts in California162 and New
York163 determined that candidate Trump’s pre-election and
post-election statements disparaging Latina and Latino
immigrants—especially Mexicans—could be an indication of a
discriminatory purpose for the DACA rescission. The Maryland
court determined that such statements should not be so
interpreted.164 The District of Columbia ruling, although broadly
sympathetic to the plaintiffs, was based solely on statutory issues and
thus did not address equal protection.165
The extent to which public statements by governmental
figures—before or after election—should be used to indicate
intentional discrimination is controversial. The controversy was
illustrated perhaps most cogently by the treatment of public
statements in the Supreme Court’s decision in Church of the Lukumi
162. The California court broadly noted that “in analyzing whether a faciallyneutral policy was motivated by a discriminatory purpose, district courts must
consider factors such as whether the policy creates a disparate impact, the historical
background and sequence of events leading up to the decision, and any relevant
legislative or administrative history.” Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., 298 F. Supp. 3d 1304, 1314 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2018) (citation
omitted). The court went on to note, for example, that the DACA rescission “had a
disproportionate impact on Latinos and Mexican nationals,” adding that plaintiffs
had alleged “a history of bias leading up to the rescission of DACA in the form of
campaign statements and other public comments by President Trump . . . .” Id.
163. The New York court noted that “[p]laintiffs identify a disheartening
number of statements made by President Donald Trump that allegedly suggest that
he is prejudiced against Latinos and, in particular Mexicans.” Batalla Vidal v.
Nielsen, 291 F. Supp. 3d 260, 276. After cataloging and reviewing certain statements
made by the President, the court concluded that “these allegations are sufficiently
racially charged, recurring, and troubling as to raise a plausible inference that the
decision to end the DACA program was substantially motivated by discriminatory
animus.” Id. at 277.
164. For example, the Maryland court rejected what it called “Plaintiffs’
reliance on the President’s misguided, inconsistent, and occasionally irrational
comments made to the media to establish an ulterior motive.” Casa de Md., 284 F.
Supp. 3d 758, 774 (D. Md. Mar. 5, 2018). The court disparaged “judicial
psychoanalysis of a drafter’s heart of hearts,” and asserted that the President’s
statements “have frequently shifted but have moderated since his election.” Id. at
774–75.
165. The D.C. court concluded that under the Administrative Procedure Act,
“DACA’s rescission was arbitrary and capricious . . . .” NAACP v. Trump, 298 F.
Supp. 3d 209, 215–16 (D.D.C. Apr. 24, 2018). The court also noted that, because it
had already concluded that DACA’s rescission violated the Administrative
Procedure Act, it was not necessary to address constitutional claims at this stage. Id.
at 246.
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Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah.166 In that case, one segment of Justice
Kennedy’s lead opinion used public statements made by individual
city council members to show that ordinances and resolutions passed
by the city council were impermissibly targeting religion.167
The practice of consulting public statements of political
officials—even during official proceedings—as a means of gauging
the intent of the body’s official action was evidently viewed by the
other justices as so problematic that only one other member of the
Court (Justice Stevens) joined in that segment of Justice Kennedy’s
lead opinion.168 However, the decision was unanimous as to its
judgment, and a majority supported all of the lead opinion except
for the segment concerning the public statements.169 This pattern
indicates how controversial the use of such statements can be to
judge discriminatory intent. Granted, the Hialeah case concerned
free exercise of religion rather than equal protection, but there is no
obvious principled reason why the desirability of using such
statements should vary between the two contexts.
The 2018 court orders addressing the DACA rescission tend to
favor the use of public statements by officials to help show
discriminatory intent. Two of the three courts explicitly favored
doing so,170 only one explicitly did not,171 and the last favored a result
analogous to those that did.172 Accordingly, the current state of the
DACA rescission legislation is further advancing the use of such
statements. This is a progressive direction, again at odds with the
administration’s apparent desire to cut back on progressive
approaches.
V. CONCLUSION
The Trump Executive Orders were rooted in a desire to revert
to the status quo ante regarding certain aspects of immigration
policy and transgender military service—a time before the Obama
administration embarked on innovation in those areas. They were
166. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
167. Id. at 540–42 (Part II-A-2 of Justice Kennedy’s lead opinion).
168. Id. at 522, 540–42.
169. Justice White joined the lead opinion except as to Part II-A, and Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas joined all of the lead opinion
except Part II-A-2. See id. at 522.
170. See supra notes 162–63 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
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thus based on a policy of stasis and resistance to certain kinds of
change, while focusing on specific exclusion.
Ironically, the judicial reaction to the Trump Executive Orders
does not support this posture of stasis. The constitutional travel ban
cases and the transgender ban case have used expansive applications
of existing doctrine to reach their results. The sanctuary jurisdictions
cases used conventional doctrines in novel ways to reach their
results. The initial judicial responses to the types of executive actions
involved in the DACA controversy failed to acknowledge a
constitutional basis for complaint. And those cases that have been
brought challenging the DACA rescission have advanced the
controversial proposition that officials’ public statements can be
used to help establish discriminatory intent. Accordingly, while the
executive branch is currently pursuing stasis, the judicial reaction
seems to be moving in the opposite direction toward expansion and
novel applications of doctrine.
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